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We analyze the security and feasibility of a protocol for Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), in a context where
only one of the two parties trusts his measurement apparatus. This scenario lies naturally between standard
QKD, where both parties trust their measurement apparatuses, and Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD), where
neither does, and can be a natural assumption in some practical situations. We show that the requirements
for obtaining secure keys are much easier to meet than for DI-QKD, which opens promising experimental
opportunities. We clarify the link between the security of this one-sided DI-QKD scenario and the demonstration
of quantum steering, in analogy to the link between DI-QKD and the violation of Bell inequalities.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Mn
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows two parties (Al-
ice and Bob) to establish secret keys at a distance, with se-
curity guaranteed by the laws of Quantum Mechanics [1]. In
standard QKD (S-QKD), the security is typically proved un-
der the assumption that Alice and Bob can trust the physi-
cal functioning of their preparation and measurement appa-
ratuses. For instance, standard security proofs for the BB84
protocol [2] assume that Alice sends qubits to Bob, prepared
in some eigenstates of the σz or σx Pauli operators, and that
Bob measures them in one of those two bases. Recent demon-
strations of hacking of the devices has shown the importance
and weakness of this assumption [3]. Moreover, since QKD
is becoming commercially available, Alice and Bob may end
up buying their devices from untrusted providers.
Remarkably, there are ways to guarantee security with
fewer assumptions. The minimal set of assumptions is the one
used in Device-Independent QKD (DI-QKD) [4, 5]. There,
Alice and Bob can certify the security of QKD based only on
the observed violation of Bell inequalities [6]: the measure-
ment apparatuses are untrusted black boxes, with a knob sup-
posedly related to the measurement settings. Alice and Bob
have only to trust the random number generator with which
they vary the positions of the knob, and of course the in-
tegrity of their locations. While the qualitative understanding
“Bell violation implies security” is certainly true, the deriva-
tion of quantitative security bounds is challenging. The most
recent results report on security against the most general at-
tacks (“coherent attacks”) under the assumption that previous
measurements do not feed any information forward to subse-
quent ones [7, 8] (or, to put it simply: that the devices are
memoryless). In addition to these (hopefully temporary) lim-
itations of the theoretical studies, DI-QKD imposes very de-
manding requirements on practical demonstrations. In par-
ticular, the Bell test would need to close the detection loop-
hole [9], which requires very high detection efficiencies [10].
Intermediate scenarios between S-QKD and DI-QKD re-
quire less trust than the former and will be easier to implement
than the latter [11]. Imagine for instance that a bank wants to
establish secret keys with its clients; the bank could invest a
lot of money to establish one trustworthy measurement de-
vice, but the clients at the other end of the channel would cer-
tainly get cheap (and insecure) detection terminals. This leads
us to study one-sided DI-QKD (1sDI-QKD): we consider an
entanglement-based scenario in which Bob’s measurement
apparatus is trusted, while Alice’s is not. In the entanglement-
based setup the source is also untrusted, although we will also
discuss prepare-and-measure (P&M) implementations where
the source is trusted. We present a security bound against co-
herent attacks with similar assumptions as in Refs. [7, 8], in
particular that the devices are memoryless, as this enables the
strongest security analysis presently available. Focusing on
practical implementations, we show that the detector efficien-
cies required for a practical implementation of 1sDI-QKD are
much lower than for DI-QKD, making it feasible with exist-
ing devices. Before that, let us start by stressing a link with a
hierarchy of tests of quantum nonlocality [12].
QKD and quantum nonlocality.— It is known that no se-
cret key can be extracted in a QKD experiment if the chan-
nel between Alice and Bob is entanglement-breaking [13].
Hence, in order to demonstrate security, one must show that
the channel preserves entanglement. The three different as-
sumptions on Alice’s and Bob’s devices mentioned above cor-
respond naturally to three different criteria for quantum non-
locality [12] (see Figure 1): S-QKD or DI-QKD require the
observed correlations to violate a separability criterion or a
Bell inequality respectively; 1sDI-QKD requires the correla-
tions to violate an EPR-steering inequality as defined in [14].
That is, if one imagines that Bob’s system has a definite (al-
beit unknown to him) quantum state, the protocol must prove
that Alice, by her choice of measurement, can affect this state.
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FIG. 1: Link between the three concepts of quantum nonlocality as
classified in [12] and the three scenarios of S-QKD, 1sDI-QKD (this
paper) and DI-QKD. In order to obtain a secret key, (i) if Alice and
Bob trust their measurement devices (transparent boxes), then they
must necessarily demonstrate entanglement; (ii) if Alice’s measure-
ment device is untrusted (black box), while Bob’s is trusted, then Al-
ice must demonstrate steering of Bob’s state; (iii) if both Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement devices are untrusted, then they must demon-
strate Bell-nonlocality. In all cases, Alice and Bob must trust their
random number generator (RNG), and the integrity of their location.
This sort of nonlocality, first discussed by Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen [15], was called ‘steering’ by Schro¨dinger [16]. In
Ref. [12] these concepts of nonlocality arose from considering
entanglement verification with untrusted parties. However,
even if Alice and Bob trust each other, as in QKD, they may
not trust their devices, which is an analogous situation. From
this perspective, our scenario of 1sDI-QKD can thus be seen
as a practical application of the concept of quantum steering.
A 1sDI-QKD protocol.— We consider the following 1sDI
version of the BBM92 entanglement-based protocol [17]: Al-
ice and Bob receive some (typically, photonic) quantum sys-
tems from an external source. Alice can choose between two
binary measurements, A1 and A2; since she does not trust her
measurement device, she treats it as a black box with two pos-
sible settings, yielding each time one of two possible outputs.
Bob, on the other hand, trusts his device to make projective
measurements B1 or B2 in some qubit subspace, typically
corresponding to the operators σz and σx respectively. Af-
ter publicly announcing which measurements they chose for
each system, Alice and Bob will try to extract a secret key
from the conclusive results of the measurements A1 and B1;
as explained below, the results of measurements A2 and B2
will allow them to estimate Eve’s information.
Alice and Bob might not always detect the photons sent by
the source, because of losses or inefficient detectors. Since
Bob trusts his detectors, he trusts that Eve cannot control his
detections. Also, Eve cannot get any useful information from
Bob’s (null) result if the photons going to him are lost or if
she keeps them. Cases where Bob gets ambiguous results
(e.g. double clicks) can be dealt with using the techniques of
Ref. [18]–see Supplemental Material [19] for details. Hence,
we can safely consider only the cases where Bob gets detec-
tions. On the other hand, since Alice’s measurement device is
untrusted, Eve could control whether her detectors click de-
pending on the state she receives and on her choice of mea-
surement setting. We can therefore not simply discard Al-
ice’s no-detection events. In case her detectors don’t click,
she records a bit value of her choice as the result of her mea-
surement, keeps track of the fact that her detectors did not
click, and tells Bob (so that they can later post-select the raw
key on Alice’s detections); Eve has access to that information.
We denote by Ai and Bi the strings of classical bits Al-
ice and Bob get from measurements Ai and Bi (and where
Bob got a detection, as discussed above). Among the bits of
A1, some correspond to actual detections by Alice, and some,
corresponding to non-detections, were simply chosen by Al-
ice herself. Everyone knows which ones are which. The de-
tected bits form a string Aps1 (they’ll be post-selected by Alice
and Bob), while those that were not actually detected form a
string Adis1 (they’ll be discarded for the key extraction), so
that A1 = (Aps1 ,Adis1 ). Bob’s corresponding bit strings are
B
ps
1 and Bdis1 , resp., so that B1 = (B
ps
1 ,B
dis
1 ). We denote
by N the length of the strings A1 and B1, and by n that of the
strings Aps1 and B
ps
1 .
Security proof and key rate.— Recently, Tomamichel and
Renner [20], together also with Lim and Gisin [22] have de-
veloped an approach to QKD based on an uncertainty rela-
tion for smooth entropies, which enables one to prove security
against coherent attacks in precisely this 1sDI-QKD scenario;
note however that one also needs (as in [7, 8]) the assumption
that the devices are memoryless [23]. To prove the security
of our protocol in realistic implementations, we extend their
analysis by considering imperfect detection efficiencies [24].
From the n-bit strings Aps1 and B
ps
1 , on which Eve may
have some (possibly quantum) information E, Alice and Bob
can extract, through classical error correction and privacy am-
plification (from Bob to Alice), a secret key of length [25]
ℓ ≈ Hǫmin(Bps1 |E)− nh(Qps1 ) . (1)
Here Hǫmin(B
ps
1 |E) denotes the smooth min-entropy [26] of
B
ps
1 , conditioned on quantum side information E; h is the bi-
nary entropy function: h(Q) ≡ −Q log2Q−(1−Q) log2(1−
Q); and Qps1 is the bit error rate between A
ps
1 and B
ps
1 .
To bound Hǫmin(B
ps
1 |E), we will use the uncertainty rela-
tion introduced in [20], which bounds Eve’s information on
B1 given Alice’s information on the incompatible observable
B2. However, we need to use the full strings B1,B2, as post-
selection may lead to an apparent violation of the uncertainty
relation. Using the chain rule [25] and the data-processing in-
equality [27] for smooth min-entropies, we first bound Eve’s
information on Bps1 relative to her information on B1:
Hǫmin(B1|E) = Hǫmin(Bps1 ,Bdis1 |E) (2)
≤ Hǫmin(Bps1 |Bdis1 E) + log2 |Bdis1 | (3)
≤ Hǫmin(Bps1 |E) +N − n . (4)
Now, consider a hypothetical run of the protocol where the
bits of A1 and B1 would be measured in the second basis; we
3denote by A2 and B2 the corresponding hypothetical strings.
From the generalized uncertainty relation of [20], one has
Hǫmin(B1|E) ≥ qN −Hǫmax(B2|A2) . (5)
where q is a measure of how distinct Bob’s two measure-
ments are; for orthogonal qubit measurements, q = 1. Here,
Hǫmax(B2|A2) is the smooth max-entropy [26] of B2, condi-
tioned on A2. It satisfies the following [22]
Hǫmax(B2|A2) . N h(Q2) , (6)
where Q2 is the bit error rate between A2 and B2. Now, since
the choice of basis was made randomly, Q2 is the same as
the bit error rate observed—without post-selection—when the
second basis was actually chosen (no matter how rarely) by
both Alice and Bob.
Substituting (4), (5) and (6) in Eq. (1), we obtain
ℓ & n [1− h(Qps1 )]−N [h(Q2) + 1− q] . (7)
In the asymptotic limit of infinite key lengths, the above ap-
proximate inequality becomes exact [21, 22]. The fraction
n/N of photons which Alice detects, given that Bob detected
one, will be denoted ηA. This allows us to write the secret key
rate r ≡ ℓ/N (the number of secret bits obtained per photon
detected by Bob, measured in the first basis), as
r ≥ ηA[1− h(Qps1 )]− h(Q2)− (1− q) . (8)
Relation to EPR-steering.— As we recalled before, the se-
cret key rate above can only be positive if Alice and Bob can
check that they share entanglement. In our 1sDI scenario, this
amounts to demonstrating quantum steering. Hence, the in-
equality ηA[1−h(Qps1 )]−h(Q2)− (1− q) ≤ 0 can be under-
stood as an EPR-steering inequality [14]. In the Supplemental
Material [19], we give a more direct proof of this claim, start-
ing from the so-called Local Hidden State model [12].
Experimental prospects.— We now turn to the feasibil-
ity analysis. Consider a typical experimental setup, where
a source sends maximally entangled 2-qubit states to Alice
and Bob, through a depolarizing channel with visibility V ,
and where, as in the BBM92 protocol, A1 = B1 = σz and
A2 = B2 = σx, with Alice’s detection efficiency being ηA as
above. (We emphasize that this is simply a model for Alice’s
measurements, which are implemented in a black box.)
The secret key rate that Alice and Bob can extract is then
bounded by (8), with q = 1 and
Qps1 = (1 − V )/2 , Q2 = (1− ηAV )/2 .
Figure 2 shows the values of the bound (8) as a function of ηA,
and for different values of V . For a perfect visibility V = 1,
one gets a positive secret key rate for all ηA > 65.9%.
This detection probability threshold is much lower than
those required for DI-QKD. For instance, if Alice and Bob
have the same detection efficiency η, then they require η >
94.6% for the protocol studied in [7], when they extract their
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FIG. 2: Solid curves: bounds (8) on the secret key rate r in a typi-
cal implementation of 1sDI-QKD, as a function of Alice’s detection
efficiency ηA, for visibilities V = 1, 0.99, 0.98, 0.95 (from top to
bottom) and q = 1. Dashed curve: for comparison, bounds (for
V = 1) for DI-QKD, obtained by adapting the security analysis of
Ref. [7], when Bob has the same detection efficiency ηB = ηA as
Alice (see Supplemental Material [19]).
key from the non-post-selected data. If the key is extracted
from the post-selected data (as we considered here for 1sDI-
QKD), the threshold remains quite high, η > 91.1% (see
Figure 2 and Supplemental Material [19]). The much lower
efficiency threshold for 1sDI-QKD compared with DI-QKD
is related to the fact that it is much easier to close the de-
tection loophole in a steering experiment [28–30] than in a
Bell test, for which there are no photonic detection-loophole
free demonstrations to date. Heralding efficiencies of ∼ 62%
have recently been reported [30], in an experiment demon-
strating detection-loophole-free quantum steering; our 1sDI-
QKD protocol could be demonstrated with a very similar (but
slightly improved) experimental setup.
Note also that in the 1sDI-QKD case, the losses between the
source and Bob’s lab do not affect the security of the protocol;
they only decrease the key rate proportionally to the decrease
of Bob’s detection rate (as long as the noise in Bob’s detectors
does not become prominent). Hence, long distances can in
principle be reached if the source stays close to Alice; this is
in contrast to the fully DI-QKD case, where the limit on the
detection efficiencies imposes a limit on the allowed distance
between Alice and Bob (although some proposals have been
suggested to overcome this problem [31–33]).
Comparison of different scenarios.— Key rate bounds for
entanglement-based QKD also apply to P&M schemes, as
long as the preparation device can be trusted to produce a
certain average state independent of Alice’s (or Bob’s, as the
case may be) choice of preparation basis (e.g. the completely
mixed state, regardless of whether σx or σz is the chosen ba-
sis). A preparation device with this property can be envis-
aged as a trusted entanglement source situated in Alice’s (or
Bob’s) laboratory, with a trusted channel between it and the
local detector. In this picture it still makes sense to consider
4the case where the local “hypothetical” detector is untrusted,
as this is equivalent to saying that we cannot trust the prepa-
ration device to prepare the desired state. Here the efficiency
(which we will denote as η∗) of the hypothetical detector mod-
els the probability that the preparation device registers to the
sender which of the two states (in the chosen basis) was sent.
For a well-functioning device this can be close to unity; even
if the preparation does use a probabilistic photon-pair source
and a detector, the sender can generate many pairs within the
time window for each system, and switch out the system (one
photon, ideally) only when its preparation is heralded by the
detection of the other. A greater experimental challenge is
the loss of the heralded photon (within the sender’s lab or en
route), which must be factored into the receiver’s efficiency.
Considering all non-trivial permutations of device trust-
worthiness, there are eight P&M scenarios, and four genuine
entanglement-based scenarios, whose security can be anal-
ysed using the methods of Refs. [20] or [7]. We remove
mirror-image scenarios by keeping only the version which is
better (or equally good) under the assumption of the privacy
amplification being from Bob to Alice, as shown in Table I.
Note that P&M by Bob with a fully trusted preparation device
(row 3) does not improve the threshold efficiency required
for Alice’s untrusted detector, as compared to steering-based
1sDI-QKD with an untrusted entanglement source (row 6).
Conclusion.— We have introduced the scenario of 1sDI-
QKD and analyzed its security against coherent attacks in
a practical situation where losses are taken into account.
Our analysis shows that the assumptions of 1sDI-QKD allow
one to significantly lower the necessary detection efficiencies
compared to fully DI-QKD, and that the requirements for ob-
taining secure key rates in an experiment are within the range
of current technology.
We have also stressed that 1sDI-QKD requires the violation
of an EPR-steering inequality, in analogy with the require-
ment of violation of a Bell inequality for security of DI-QKD.
The relation between the QKD hierarchy and the nonlocality
hierarchy introduces some open questions: (i) It has recently
been shown that steering can be demonstrated with arbitrarily
low efficiencies [28]. Can one find (and prove the security of)
1sDI-QKD protocols that would also tolerate arbitrarily low
efficiencies? (ii) With 2 measurement settings per party, steer-
ing can be demonstrated for efficiencies ηA > 50% [28, 30].
There is a large gap between this and the threshold of ∼ 66%
for our 1sDI-QKD protocol. The same situation occurs for
fully DI-QKD, where there is also a gap between the thresh-
old of η > 82.8% for a violation of the CHSH inequality [34]
and that for the security of DI-QKD. How small can these be
made in general? Another topic for further research is to ex-
tend our results to finite keys, for instance along the lines of
Ref. [22].
Acknowledgements.— This work was supported by the
Australian Research Council Programs CE110001027 and
DP0984863, the National Research Foundation and the Min-
istry of Education, Singapore, the Brazilian agencies CNPq,
FAPERJ, and the INCT-Informac¸a˜o Quaˆntica.
Based on AD C S C BD Key rate bound Eff. Thresh.
P&M T T T U T r0(Qps1 , Q
ps
2 ) none
P&M U T T U T r1(Qps1 , Q2) η∗A > 65.9%
P&M U U T T T r1(Qps1 , Q2) ηA > 65.9%
P&M U U T T U r2(Qps1 , S) ηA > 83.3%
Entang. T U U U T r0(Qps1 , Q
ps
2 ) none
Steering U U U U T r1(Qps1 , Q2) ηA > 65.9%
Bell U U U U U r2(Qps1 , S) η > 91.1%
TABLE I: Best known bounds on secret key rates for QKD (secure
against coherent attacks) with privacy amplification from Bob to Al-
ice and memoryless devices, both P&M and entanglement-based.
The second column tells which of the components—Alice’s detec-
tors (AD), the source (S), Bob’s detector (BD) and each of the chan-
nels (C) between the source and the detectors—are trusted (T) or
untrusted (U). Thick vertical lines in each row separate Alice’s lab,
the channel open to Eve, and Bob’s lab. In the P&M cases, the de-
tector plus source in a lab is a formal model for a preparation device;
the efficiency η∗ in these cases models the probability that the prepa-
ration device registers which state is prepared, and would typically
be close to unity (for details see text). In column three, the bounds
on key rates (here, per photon pair produced by the source, i.e. per
preparation event in the P&M cases) are given in terms of the func-
tions r0(Qps1 , Q
ps
2 ) ≡ ηBηA[1 − h(Q
ps
1 ) − h(Q
ps
2 )] from S-QKD,
r1(Q
ps
1 , Q2) ≡ ηB{ηA[1 − h(Q
ps
1 )] − h(Q2)} from Eq. (8), and
r2(Q
ps
1 , S) ≡ ηAηB [1 − h(Q
ps
1 )] − log2
[
1 +
√
2− (S/2)2
] (see
Supplemental Material [19]). Here S is the value of the CHSH poly-
nomial [34], while Q1 and Q2 are bit error rates. The superscript ps
means post-selection on coincident detections; Q2 in r1(Qps1 , Q2) is
post-selected on Bob’s detections, but not on Alice’s; S must be esti-
mated from the whole non-postselected data. The Efficiency Thresh-
olds (column four) are calculated with everything else perfect. In row
4, we assumed η∗B → 1 (the threshold we quote is therefore a lower
bound on the thresholds for η∗B < 1), while in row 7, ηA = ηB = η.
Note added.— While finishing writing this manuscript, we
became aware of a related work [35] where similar bounds on
the detection efficiency thresholds are derived.
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6Supplemental Material
Practical detectors and multiple counts.— In practical im-
plementations with photons, Bob’s detector comprises two
photon counters, corresponding to his two possible outputs.
Because of dark counts or imperfect state preparation (i.e. the
presence of multi-photon states) there will be rare occasions
where both counters click. In such cases, our protocol requires
Bob to output a random result. This is a standard way to treat
double clicks in the context of QKD [S1]. When Bob imple-
ments the σz or σx measurements, his detection scheme has
a “squashing property” that should allow one to extend the
present theoretical security proof for perfect qubit states (on
Bob’s side) to imperfect implementations [S2].
Direct proof that “r ≤ 0” is a steering inequality.— We
obtained in Eq. (8) in the main text a bound on the secret
key rate of our 1sDI-QKD protocol. As we argued, a posi-
tive secret key rate can be obtained only if Alice and Bob can
demonstrate steering. That is, if they violate the inequality
“r.h.s of Eq. (8)≤ 0”, or more explicitly
ηh(Qps1 ) + h(Q2) + (1−η) ≥ q , (S1)
then they can conclude that they have demonstrated steering:
Eq. (S1) thus defines an EPR-steering inequality [S3].
Here we show in a different way that (S1) is indeed an EPR-
steering inequality, starting more directly from the Local Hid-
den State model [S3]—a local model whereby the statistics
observed by Alice and Bob can be decomposed as [S4]
P (a˜i, bj) =
∑
λ
P (λ)P (a˜i|λ)PQ(bj |λ), (S2)
where a˜i = (ai, s), with ai = ±1 and bj = ±1 denoting the
experimental outcomes corresponding to measurements Ai,
Bj , and s denoting whether Alice gets a detection (s = 1) or
not (s = 0); recall that in case of no detection, Alice’s result
ai is chosen to be a pre-established bit in our 1sDI-QKD pro-
tocol and will contribute to the bit string Adisi . The subscript
Q indicates that Bob’s statistics are determined by quantum
mechanics: PQ(bj |λ) = Tr[Ejρλ], where ρλ is some quan-
tum state (in our case, a qubit state) and {Ej} are the positive
operators summing to unity which describe his measurements.
The variable λ fully specifies the quantum state received
by Bob. As a consequence, Alice can have no more informa-
tion on average about Bob’s results than what one could know
through λ. In terms of conditional entropies, this implies that
H(Bi|A˜i) ≥ H(Bi|Λ) , (S3)
where H(Bi|A˜i) =
∑
a˜i
P (a˜i)H(Bi|a˜i) and
H(Bi|Λ) =
∑
λ P (λ)H(Bi|λ) are the average en-
tropies of Bob’s measurement Bi conditioned on the
knowledge of the result of A˜i and of λ, respectively,
with H(Bi|a˜i) = −
∑
bi
P (bi|a˜i) log2 P (bi|a˜i) and
H(Bi|λ) = −
∑
bi
PQ(bi|λ) log2 PQ(bi|λ).
Now, Bob’s statistics, conditioned on λ, are by assumption
given by a quantum state; they must therefore satisfy all quan-
tum uncertainty relations, and in particular
H(B1|λ) +H(B2|λ) ≥ q, (S4)
where q quantifies how different the measurementsB1 andB2
are [S5]. Together with (S3), we obtain
H(B1|A˜1) +H(B2|A˜2) ≥ q. (S5)
Denoting Apsi for Ai when si = 1 and Adisi for Ai when
si = 0, and assuming that P (si = 1) = ηA independently
of Ai (as should be the case if it is a detector efficiency), we
have
H(Bi|A˜i) = ηAH(Bpsi |Apsi ) + (1−ηA)H(Bdisi |Adisi ). (S6)
Now, one can easily check (using for instance the concavity
of the binary entropy function) that for binary variables A and
B, one has
H(B|A) ≤ h(Q), (S7)
where Q is the bit error rate relative to A and B (the proba-
bility that A 6= B). Applying this to (S6) for i = 1, it follows
that
H(B1|A˜1) ≤ ηAh(Qps1 ) + (1− ηA), (S8)
while on the other hand
H(B2|A˜2) ≤ H(B2|A2) ≤ h(Q2). (S9)
Substituting (S8) and (S9) in (S5) we finally obtain (S1), as
desired.
Note that for the purpose of deriving an EPR-steering in-
equality, there is no need to follow the last steps of the
above procedure where we treat and bound H(B1|A˜1) and
H(B2|A˜2) differently. Rather we can use Eq. (S5) directly
as an EPR-steering inequality. Under the usual conditions for
QKD as discussed in the main text, q = 1 and Eq. (S8) be-
comes a tight inequality, so Eq. (S5) then becomes
ηA[2− h(Qps1 )− h(Qps2 )] ≤ 1. (S10)
For perfect correlations (Qps1 = Qps2 = 0), this will be vio-
lated (indicating EPR-steering) provided that ηA > 12 . This is
the minimum possible efficiency threshold for EPR-steering
using two settings [S6].
Comparison with DI-QKD.— In the DI-QKD case, the
strongest security analysis available today is that of Masanes,
7Pironio and Acı´n [S7], who showed the security of a large
class of protocols against coherent attacks (under the techni-
cal assumption that the devices are memoryless). In the sim-
plest version, the protocol they consider involves Alice and
Bob measuring in bases that enable a CHSH inequality [S8]
to be tested, where one of Bob’s bases is that which is used
(together with a different one of Alice’s bases) to yield the se-
cret shared key. Let the CHSH polynomial have the value S
(such that |S| < 2√2 for quantum correlations, and |S| > 2
indicates a violation of the CHSH inequality), and let the non-
post-selected quantum bit error rate for measurements in the
bases that will yield the key be Q1. Then Ref. [S7] shows that
the final key rate can be bounded from below by
rMPA = 1− h(Q1)− log2
[
1 +
√
2− (S/2)2]. (S11)
For a visibility V and inefficiencies ηA and ηB , we have a raw
shared random key with bit error rate Q1 = [1− (1−ηA)(1−
ηB)−V ηAηB]/2, and a CHSH parameter S = 2
√
2V ηAηB+
2(1 − ηA)(1 − ηB). The latter is obtained if Alice and Bob
use the same predetermined list of random results whenever
they fail to detect a photon. With V = 1 and ηA = ηB =
η, Eq. (S11) yields a positive key rate for η > 94.5%. In
the situation of prepare-and-measure (P&M), where there is a
trusted source in Bob’s lab, but his detector is still untrusted,
we replace ηB by η∗B , Bob’s preparation efficiency. Taking
η∗B → 1, Eq. (S11) gives a lower bound η−A > 89.6%.
We now show that Alice and Bob can improve their se-
cret key rate by extracting their secret key from the data post-
selected on coincidence detections, as we suggested here for
the case of 1sDI-QKD. Indeed, one can apply our analysis to
that of Ref. [S7] to find a new secret key rate bounded from
below by
r2 = ηAηB [1− h(Qps1 )]− log2
[
1 +
√
2− (S/2)2]. (S12)
Here S is unchanged from above (it must still be estimated
from the whole non-postselected data), while Qps1 = (1 −
V )/2. With V = 1 and ηA = ηB = η, this yields a positive
key rate for η > 91.1%. Considering again the P&M case
with η∗B → 1, we obtain the lower bound η−A > 83.3%. These
are the figures appearing in Table 1 in the main text. In both
cases, but especially the P&M case, using our post-selection
technique yields substantially better efficiency thresholds than
the non-post-selected protocols. We note that somewhat lower
efficiency thresholds for DI-QKD (η > 92.3% and η >
88.9% for the entanglement-based schemes, with and without
post-selection, resp.) can be obtained using the analysis of
Ref. [S9]. However, this analysis shows security only against
collective attacks (which includes, in particular, the assump-
tion that the devices are memoryless).
In the main text we presented only the post-selected ver-
sion of 1sDI-QKD. However one can also consider a non-
post-selected version of that, in which Alice and Bob try to
extract a secret key directly from the non-post-selected data
A1,B1 (rather than from Aps1 ,Bps1 ; note however that we
still post-select on a detection by Bob). In this case the
key rate per detection by Bob is bounded from below by
1−h(Q1)−h(Q2) for security against coherent attacks. Here
for a typical implementation the bit error rates are both given
by Qi = (1 − V ηA)/2, and with V = 1, we get a positive
rate for ηA > 78.0%. Recall that when Alice and Bob use
the post-selected data, the threshold is ηA > 65.9%, so the
improvement is even more dramatic than in the fully DI case.
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